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The Theoretical Framework of Earnings Management 
LA STRUCTURE THÉORIQUE DU MANAGEMENT DES REVENUS 
Ning Yaping1 
 
Abstract: The definition of earnings management has been inconsistent in the literature. Major 
problems with the definition include ambiguity and immeasurability. As a solution, this paper 
intends to develop a constructive definition of earnings management and discuss the conceptual 
distinctions between earnings management and its counterparts. The review of the literature 
provides evidence of the validity of the developed definitions. The results of the paper are important 
for both theoretical and empirical researches on earnings management, as well as for regulators, 
lawmakers, firms’ contracting parties and investors. 
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Résumé: La définition du management des revenues a été contradictoire dans la littérature. Les 
problèmes majeurs sur la définition comprend l’ambigueté et immeasurabilité. En tant que solution, 
ce documentr a l’ambition de développer une définition constructive du management des revenues 
et de discuter sur les distinctions conceptionelles entre le management des revenues et ses 
contreparites. La revue de la littérature  sert le témoingnage de la validité de définitions 
développées..Les résultat de ce document sont importants pour les recherches théoriques et 
empiriques sur le management des revenues, aussi pour les régulateurs, législateurs, les parties 
contractuelles et d’investissements des entreprises. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper intends to study the theoretical framework of 
earnings management by developing a constructive 
definition of earnings management and discussing the 
conceptual distinctions between earnings management 
and its counterparts. Earnings, represented by the 
bottom line of the income statement, is a summary item 
in financial statements. Financial statements are firms’ 
primary way of communicating firm value and 
performance to shareholders and other relevant parties. 
They provide an avenue through which managers 
disseminate some privately held information. The 
preparation of financial statements is guided and 
regulated by accounting standards, rules, or principles, 
called as the generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) in the United States. Every country has its own 
accounting standards. 
The research is motivated by the following four facts. 
First, the literature has revealed an inconsistency in the 
definitions of earnings management, especially on the 
question if earnings management is a fraud, triggering 
confusions in the understanding of earnings 
management. Second, the various definitions of 
earnings management in the literature, especially the 
most cited ones, are problematic especially from the 
perspective of empirical researches. Third, to my 
knowledge, never has earnings management been 
measured directly in empirical researches, indirect 
measures (e.g. indicators that measure the possible 
consequences of earnings management) are used instead. 
The major problems with indirect measures include 
their representiveness of the unit and if they are caused 
by multiple reasons besides earning management. 
Fourth, there had been mixed results from empirical 
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research on earnings management, making the 
interpretation difficulty. Plausible explanations for the 
fact include that earnings management has different 
meanings in different researches, and/or the measures 
used for earnings management were noisy.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section 
offers a constructive definition of earnings management. 
Section three reviews the definitions of earnings 
management found in prior researches for the purpose 
of evaluating the definitions developed in section two. 
Section four explains the significance of this research as 
a conclusion. 
 
2.  A CONSTRUCTIVE DEFINITION OF 
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
As a solution to the problems caused by the 
inconsistency in the definitions of earnings 
management, this paper distinguishes earnings 
management from earnings manipulation, earnings 
fraud, and creative accounting. In the paper, “earnings 
manipulation” means that management takes 
deliberate steps to bring reported earnings to a desired 
level; “earnings management” refers to the earnings 
manipulation through exercising the discretion 
accorded by accounting standards and corporate laws, 
and/or structuring activities in such a way that expected 
firm value is not affected negatively; “earnings fraud” 
refers to the earnings manipulation by violating 
accounting standards and corporate laws, and/or 
structuring activities in such a way that reduces 
expected firm value; while “creative accounting” refers 
to the earnings manipulation practices that do not 
violate accounting standards or corporate laws because 
of the lack of relevant standards or laws, for example, 
when firms engage in business innovations. 
Earnings manipulation has five distinctive 
features under the proposed definition. First, earnings 
are manipulated by management rather than accountants. 
Second, earnings are manipulated knowingly and 
intentionally. Hence, earnings manipulation is different 
from unintentional errors such as mistakenly entering 
incorrect numbers by accountants. Third, the steps taken 
for earnings manipulation include not only accounting 
choices but also real business decisions. For instance, 
accelerating the timing of sales through increased price 
discounts or more lenient credit terms might lead to an 
increase in the current period’s reported earnings but a 
decrease in expected firm value. Earnings manipulation 
by means of business decisions is named as “real 
earnings manipulation”, while earnings manipulation by 
means of accounting choices is “paper earnings 
manipulation”. Fourth, the type of earnings manipulated 
in paper earnings manipulation is reported earnings, 
while the type of earnings manipulated in real earnings 
manipulation is economic earnings. However, the 
ultimate purpose of real earnings manipulation is to 
influence the reported earnings. Fifth, the extent of 
earnings manipulation (i.e. how far would earnings 
manipulation go) totally depends on the level of 
reported earnings desired by management. 
Earnings manipulation has three different forms: 
earnings management, earnings fraud, and creative 
accounting. The three are exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive. Earnings manipulation through exercising 
the accounting discretion accorded by accounting 
standards and corporate laws is “paper earnings 
management”. “Real earnings management” – earnings 
manipulation through restructuring activities or 
business transactions in a legitimate way – has either a 
positive impact (e.g. adding a new profitable product 
line) or a neutral impact (e.g. accelerating the timing of 
sales at unchanged prices) on expected firm value.  
On the other hand, earnings manipulation by 
violating accounting standards and/or corporate laws is 
“paper earnings fraud”. “Real earnings fraud” refers to 
the earnings manipulation through restructuring 
activities or business transactions in such a way that 
expected firm value is reduced, while the restructuring 
may or may not violate corporate laws and/or 
accounting standards. Business transactions that do not 
violate accounting standards or corporate laws but 
reduce expected firm value indicate the existence of 
significant defects in the accounting standards or 
corporate laws. For instance, some accounting standards 
are so sketchy as to leave too much room for 
manipulation. In terms of Enron case, its business 
transactions with related companies, though not 
violating GAAP or corporate laws of United States, 
reduced expected firm value because firm risks were 
increased due to considerably increased debts. 
Accordingly, what Enron did is real earnings fraud. 
Real earnings fraud might have negative impacts on 
firm’s expected and book value (e.g. overproduction, 
accelerating sales by offering reduced listed price to 
increase current period’s revenues at the expense of 
next period’s revenues), and a neutral or positive impact 
on firm’s book value in current period but a negative 
impact on expected firm value (e.g. transferring bad 
property to a subsidiary, bribing auditors).  
Since accounting standards and corporate laws differ 
from country to country, under the proposed definitions, 
it is then possible for the same type of practice to be 
categorized as earnings management in one country but 
as earnings fraud in the other. Earnings fraud is specific 
to and punished by individual countries. Unless 
countries share the same accounting standards and 
corporate laws can this problem be solved.  
The distinction between earnings management and 
management fraud used to be a thin line (Brown, 1999). 
Under the definitions proposed above, however, the line 
is made relatively easier to be determined and measured: 
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when accounting standards or corporate laws are 
violated, no matter how many, paper earnings fraud is 
committed; the more standards and laws are violated 
and/or the greater amount is involved, the more material 
will paper earnings fraud be. The examination of the 
compliance of standards and laws resembles the process 
of auditing, and can be conducted using multiple 
approaches, including face-to-face interviews, 
questionnaires and scrutinizing notes of financial 
statements. The difficulty in the examination of real 
earnings management is the explicit determination of 
the impact on firm value. 
Creative accounting occurs when, for example, an 
accounting standard is too specific to cope with 
business innovations. Creative accounting is mutually 
exclusive with earnings management and earnings fraud, 
and it is neither a fraudulent nor a legitimate practice. In 
other words, in terms of applying accounting standards 
and corporate laws, there is no overlap between creative 
accounting and earnings management or earnings fraud. 
However, in terms of the impact on firm value, creative 
accounting overlaps with earnings management if it 
does not decrease expected firm value, and overlaps 
with earnings fraud it does so. Creative accounting can 
also be performed through accounting choices or real 
actions; the former is “paper creative accounting”, 
while the later is “real creative accounting”. As a 
summary, figure 1 illustrates the relationships among 
the various forms of earnings manipulation. 
3.  A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF 
LITERATURE ON EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT DEFINITION 
 
There has been no clear consensus on what is earnings 
management in the literature (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Messod, 2001). Although SEC sources often mention 
“earnings management”, none of the SEC sources 
explicitly defines earnings management (Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000). The various attempts at defining 
earnings management in the accounting literature can be 
categorized into four approaches. Defined in terms of 
management intent, earnings management is a 
purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with management intent of obtaining 
some private gain (Schipper, 1989; Cormier & Magnan, 
1996; Bagnoli & Watts, 2000) via, for example, 
masking the true consequences of management’s 
decisions (Levitt, 1998); the form of the gain might be 
management benefit and/or firm’s benefit (Eighme & 
Cashell, 2002). On the other hand, Healy & Wahlen 
(1999) posit that earnings management involves 
managers using their judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
statements so as to either mislead some shareholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the 
company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers. The problem 
with this approach is that management intent is 
unobservable. No one can be certain if earnings are 
manipulated for management or firm’s benefit, or to 
mislead information users. Consequently, the unit 
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‘earnings management’ is impossible to be measured 
directly or operationalized accurately via attributes of 
reported accounting numbers.  
In terms of the quality of reported earnings 
information, United State’s former SEC Chairman 
Levitt defined earnings management as practices by 
which “earnings reports reflect the desires of 
management rather than the underlying financial 
performance of the company” (See Duncan, 2001). In 
other words, earnings management is the manipulation 
of reported earnings so that they do not accurately 
represent economic earnings at every point in time 
(Goel & Thakor, 2003). The problem with this 
approach is that no one knows a firm’s underlying or 
economic earnings due to information asymmetry, 
making the direct measurement of earnings 
management defined in this way impossible too. 
According to Watts & Zimmerman (1990) and 
Evans III & Sridhar (1996), earnings management is the 
strategic exercise of management discretion over 
accounting numbers with or without restrictions. For 
Levitt, earnings management is to exploit an advantage 
of the flexibility in accounting so as to keep pace with 
business innovations (Levitt, 1998), namely, earnings 
management is a practice of creative accounting. In a 
word, earnings management is neither a legitimate nor 
an illegal practice so long as management discretion 
over accounting numbers or accounting flexibility is 
exercised. This approach of defining earnings 
management in terms of management reporting 
discretion is also empirically problematic, because there 
is unlikely to be a control group of “earnings 
management”: managers of all firms are expected to use 
their discretion of reporting if they are rational and 
opportunistic.  
Definitions of earnings management in terms of 
accounting standard application fall into two major 
types. First, earnings management is the practice of 
firms’ misapplying accounting standards (e.g. U.S. SEC 
Chief Accountant Lynn Turner2; Johnson, 1999). To 
misapply is to use wrongly or for a wrong purpose 
(Procter, 1987). Thus, earnings management to Turner 
and Johnson is the practice of using accounting 
standards (i.e. within the bounds of accounting 
standards, or legitimate) wrongly or for a wrong 
purpose – consistent with the approach of defining 
earnings management in terms of management intent. A 
related view is held by Dechow & Skinner (2000). They 
identify three practices: (a) fraudulent accounting 
practices, (b) earnings management, and (c) the 
legitimate exercise of accounting discretion. They 
explained that both practices (b) and (c) are within the 
constraints of accounting standards, what distinguishes 
the two is management intent: if the practice is meant to 
deceive, it is (b), otherwise it is (c). These authors 
                                                          
2 See Magrath & Weld (2002).  
regard earnings management as legitimate practices but 
with management intent to deceive information users. 
However, a legitimate practice has nothing to be 
accursed of, no matter what the intent might be, not to 
mention that intent is unobservable.  
As for the second type of definition from this 
approach, earnings management is the process of taking 
deliberate steps within the bounds of accounting 
standards so as to bring reported earnings to a desired 
level (Brown, 1999). As can be seen, this definition is 
consistent with what has been discussed about paper 
earnings management in the section above. Defined in 
this way, paper earnings management is empirically 
measurable. To sum up, the four approaches under 
which earnings management has been defined indicate 
why earnings are manipulated, what has been 
manipulated, how earnings are manipulated, and the 
legitimacy of the way to manipulate earnings 
respectively. 
To assess the existence of earnings management for 
empirical researches, three major approaches have been 
used in the literature: accruals (i.e. the difference 
between reported earnings and cash flows from 
operations), earnings distribution, and return on assets 
ratio. All the three represent some of the possible 
consequences of earnings management. Healy & 
Wahlen (1999) believe that unexpected accruals (i.e. the 
residual item after total accruals are regressed on 
variables that are indicators for normal accruals and 
gross fixed assets) are the evidence of earnings 
management, because unexpected accruals are the 
unexplained part of total accruals. On the other hand, 
Messod (2001) used specific accruals (e.g. the provision 
for bad debt; accruals in specific sectors, such as the 
claim loss reserve in the insurance industry) to assess 
earnings management. However, the accruals approach 
is problematic for at least three reasons. First, although 
discretionary accruals might be affected by managerial 
choices, the relationship between earnings management 
and unexpected accruals can be no more than an 
assumption due to information asymmetry; namely, the 
two are not necessarily of cause-and-effect relationship. 
Second, unexpected accruals are a noisy variable. Third, 
the accrual approach is not exhaustive or inclusive, 
because accruals are only one type of the objects that 
can be manipulated, other objects include, for example, 
product costs; and unexpected or specific accruals 
represent, if may, the existence of paper earnings 
manipulation only. 
Goel & Thakor (2003) measures earnings 
management with earnings distribution: if earnings 
distribution over various accounting periods is smooth, 
then earnings in the firms had been managed. This 
approach is problematic mainly for two reasons. First, 
smooth earnings distribution is not necessarily caused 
by earnings management, it might represent actual 
performance. Second, earnings distribution is also a 
noisy variable, because earnings manipulation is only 
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one of multiple causes of smooth earnings distribution. 
Balsam et al. (1995) uses return on assets (i.e. net 
income / average total assets) to assess earnings 
management. Being a noisy variable, the ratio is not a 
necessary cause of earnings management either. In sum, 
the indicators used to measure earnings management so 
far are not representative enough to produce reliable 
empirical results. Instead, they represent possible 
consequences of earnings manipulation rather than 
those of earnings management alone. 
Other problems in the researches on earnings 
management include earnings management being 
observed under various other names, such as “earnings 
manipulation”, “apparent extreme earnings 
manipulation” (Marin et al., 2002), “window dressing 
action” (Dutta & Gigler, 2002), or “within-GAAP 
manipulation” (Dechow et al., 1996); and the term 
“earnings management” being used to represent 
different things by different authors. In all, earnings 
management has been used in the accounting literature 
to represent five different concepts: earnings 
manipulation (e.g. Healy & Wahlen, 1999), paper 
earnings manipulation (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman, 
1990), paper earnings fraud (e.g. Marin et al., 2002), 
paper earnings management (e.g. Dechow & Skinner, 
2000), and creative accounting (Levitt, 1998). An 
explanation to this phenomenon is a lack of consensus 
on if earnings management is different from earnings 
manipulation, if earnings management is fraudulent, 
and if there is a difference between paper earnings 
management and real earnings management. As a result, 
these problems have provoked the confusion in the 
research on earnings management.  
In the literature, earnings management is often 
regarded as the synonym of earnings manipulation, and 
sometimes as an alternative of earnings fraud. However, 
the attempt of distinguishing earnings management 
from earnings manipulation and earnings fraud has been 
found in the literature. Such attempts may be 
categorized from the perspective of the number of items 
identified. In the two-item approach, earnings 
management is distinguished from “earnings 
manipulation” (Dechow et al., 1996) 3 , “truthful 
reporting” (Evans III & Sridhar, 1996), “fraud” (Brown, 
1999), “fraudulent financial reporting” (Landsittel, 
2000), or “outright fraudulent financial reporting” 
(Marin et al., 2002). In the three-item approach, 
earnings management is distinguished from “fraudulent 
accounting practices” and “legitimate exercise of 
accounting discretion” (Dechow & Skinner, 2000), or 
“fraud” and “accounting irregularities” (Magrath & 
Weld, 2002).  
                                                          
3 Though realising that earnings management is different from 
earnings manipulation, the authors did not explain the 
difference in-between. 
Real earnings manipulation has often been 
overlooked in the literature. To Schipper, “real earnings 
management” is something that is “accomplished by 
timing investment or financing decisions to alter 
reported earnings or some subset of it”. (Schipper, 1989) 
Other works contributed to the research on real earnings 
manipulation include Jiambalvo (1996), Goel & Thakor 
(2003) and Roychowdhury (2003), the most 
constructive one being Roychowdhury (2003). 
 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To sum up, earnings manipulation is management’s 
action taken to bring about a desired level of reported 
earnings. When earnings manipulation is performed 
through exercising the discretion accorded by 
accounting standards and corporate laws, and/or 
structuring activities in such a way that expected firm 
value is not affected negatively, it is earnings 
management, otherwise it is earnings fraud. The paper 
contributes to the theoretical framework of earnings 
management by developing an explicit and vigorous 
definition of earnings management, specifying different 
forms of earnings manipulation, and distinguishing 
earnings management from earning manipulation, 
earnings fraud and creative accounting. 
There are now too many contradictorily distinct 
explanations for earnings management (Arya et al., 
1998), and it has been ambiguous – both academically 
and practically – if earnings management is a fraud. The 
consequences of the inconsistence or lack of the 
consensus include unreliable testing of the theories of 
earnings management with field or laboratory data 
(Arya et al., 1998), conflicting interpretations of 
empirical evidence on earnings management (Messod, 
2001), apparent inconsistency in empirical results, and 
irreproducibility of the same research by other equally 
trained observers. An explanation to the continuous 
emerge of new definitions of earnings management and 
the lack of consensus on the definition is that people 
find previous definitions imperfect in some aspects, and 
want to do something to improve the situation. Yet, up 
to now, the definitions of earnings management are still 
unscientific mainly because the unit has to be indirectly 
measured – measures of possible and non-exclusive 
consequences of earnings management are used instead. 
As a result, the measures of earnings management 
cannot help to be noisy, impeding reliable empirical 
testing of the theories of earnings management. The 
results of this research offer a solution to the problem. 
With the definitions proposed in this research, the unit 
of earnings management can be directly measured: 
earnings management occurs when every accounting 
standard and corporate law is complied with; when any 
accounting standard or corporate law is violated, 
earnings fraud is then committed; the degree of earnings 
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fraud increases with an increase in the number of 
standards and laws violated.  
The need to precisely define earnings management 
arises also because it concerns many other parties 
including regulators, firms and investors. If earnings 
legitimately manipulated in the ordinary course of 
business and earnings fraudulently manipulated are not 
clearly distinguished first, it is impossible for the SEC 
to initiate and justify its enforcement actions. When 
earnings management is indicated by some phenomena 
that are the possible consequences of earnings fraud, 
earnings management and real performance, it is hard 
for SEC to determine if firm commits earnings fraud. 
With an ambiguous definition of earnings management, 
firms that practice earnings management might be 
treated in the same manner as those that practice 
earnings fraud, provoking wasteful conflicts and 
unnecessary disputes between firms and regulatory 
bodies, and indirectly encouraging earnings fraud.  
In general, everything has two sides. In terms of 
earnings manipulation, earnings fraud is its negative 
side while earnings management is its positive side. 
Earnings management is firms’ strategic tool for 
maximizing firm value and reducing risks. A systematic 
and scientific study of the value-adding functions of 
earnings management is presented in Ning (2005). 
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